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LAST CLEAR CHANCE FOR AN ENDURING MARITIME POLICY*
By Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., Ph.D.
1998
Emeritus Professor of Management and Economics, Clemson University

PART I
MERCHANT MARINE
A U.S. flag, foreign trade, merchant marine has been subsidized in one form or another
since l845. Similarly, a U.S. domestic trade fleet has been indirectly aided since l789, and
directly supported since l920. (l)
In the post World War II era, the rationale for federal support of this tonnage was
mainly in the context of national security requirements. In this period, various support
measures were signed into law.....others failed. (2)
Maritime legislation historically has always been contentious, generally because of the
relatively large number of (conflicting) interest groups affected. Appendix A lists the
players that give form and substance in shaping American maritime policy.
With the end of the Cold War, circa l992, the national security rationale has been
questioned as the mainstay for continued government support of a merchant marine.
Proponents of a U.S. flag fleet argue the rationale is still valid although changed in terms
of missions and requirements.
In l995, a number of maritime related issues were debated in the Congress and the
maritime community in general. Issues included:
1. Operating subsidies for 40-50, "militarily useful," containerships engaged in
foreign trade. The estimated cost of the program was $l billion over a l0 year
period. (3) While different versions of enabling and authorization bills passed
both the House and Senate, no bill became law in l995.
2. Ending the 22 year old ban on the (foreign) export of Alaskan oil. Legislation to
this end was signed into law by President Clinton on 28 November l995. The
maritime support part of the act required foreign exported oil be carried in
U.S.-flag tankers. Domestic exports were already limited to U.S.-flag tankers
under existing law. (Section 27, Merchant Marine Act of l920)
3. Repeal or modification of the so-called Jones Act (Section 27, Merchant Marine
Act of l920) provisions which require that all ocean freight movements between
U.S. ports be carried in U.S.-flag, U.S.-built ships.
4. Repeal or modification of the U.S. Passenger Vessel Services Act (l886). This law
restricts the carriage of passengers between American ports to U.S. flag, U.S.
built vessels. On the other side, maritime supporters tried to amend the law to

5

prevent foreign flag cruise ships from engaging in "voyages to nowhere," i.e.,
sailing from an American port to a point in international waters and returning to
that same port. A recent U.S. Customs ruling held that the practice was legal
within the meaning of present law.
5. Sunsetting the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) and transferring any of its
remaining regulatory functions to the Department of Transportation or
Department of Justice.
6. Bringing U.S. (vessel) safety and manning requirements into line with
international standards.
7. Repeal of cargo preference laws, primarily as they affect U.S. agricultural
exports. Present law requires that l00 percent of defense cargo, 75 percent of
donated food aid, and 50 percent of other government impelled freight move
on U.S. flag vessels.
8. Defining the national security role, if any, of U.S. owned, foreign flag vessels
considered as being under effective U.S. control (EUSC) (American seagoing
maritime union consider the EUSC concept as a thinly disguised justification for
transferring American tonnage to "flag of convenience" countries.
All in all it seems fair to say that l996 is a critical year for American flag shipping. In fact,
l996 may be the last clear chance to formulate and enact an enduring maritime policy,
while at the same time granting that l996 may be the worst year in the past century to
fund new, multi-million dollar federal programs. (4)
Recommendations
A comprehensive maritime policy would include the following:
*Government financial support for creating and maintaining a defined number of
"essential," door to door, worldwide logistics pipelines. While a U.S.-flag merchant
would be a critical component of such systems, it would not be the only component.
U.S.-owned multimodal transportation companies would provide service over one
or more of these essential logistics pipelines.
In essence, the notion of an essential logistics pipeline is simply an extension of the
earlier "essential trade route" concept found in the Merchant Marine Act of l936. (5)
Government subsidy payments, if necessary, would be to a multimodal transportation
firm, not a liner operator. Department of Defense input would insure that any system
of international logistics pipelines, both in terms of number and throughput capacity,
was adequate for defense needs.
*Centralizing all sealift support activities in DOD's Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). This
consolidation would include all Maritime Administration (Marad) functions that relate to
DOD sealift requirements. e.g. Administering any subsidy payments to a multimodal
transportation company. By the same token, all Military Sealift Command (MSC) sealift
support activities would be transferred to DLA. Appendix B discusses the present and
historical role of MSC as a provider of merchant-type shipping in time of peace, war
and national emergency. The Defense Logistics Agency would be the interface between

6

private sector multimodal transport firms (as the operators of sealift capital assets), the
private sector suppliers of personnel to operate sealift "hardware," e.g., seagoing
maritime unions, and the Department of Defense as the residual beneficiary of these
assets in time of war or national emergency.
*The education of licensed and unlicensed merchant mariners would be tasked to the
private sector or state/local levels of government. The federal government would end
all support to the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point and the present six
state maritime academies. If Kings Point were to remain a maritime educational
institution, it would be funded by the entire maritime industry, including maritime
unions.
*American seagoing unions would be recognized as important and permanent players
with respect to insuring the long term viability of the merchant marine component of
U.S. multimodal logistics pipeline systems. Their most important role would be in
maintaining an active and inactive pool of merchant mariners. Coordinating maritime
union educational and training activities and DOD sealift needs would be a
responsibility within the DLA.
*Continue deregulation of American shipping as begun under the Shipping Act of l984.
This includes abolishing the FMC and transferring any residual oversight functions to
the Departments of Transportation and Justice as appropriate. The l995 understanding
between Sealand Services, the largest U.S.- flag containership operator, and the National
Industrial Transportation League (a major shipper group) illustrates that seemingly
irreconcilable differences can be resolved absent a federal regulatory presence.
*Bring U.S. vessel safety standards into line with international standards. Too often,
such a recommendation is read as a lowering of U.S. standards, with little attention paid
to the option of raising international standards.
*Indirect maritime support programs, i.e., the Jones Act (l920), the Passenger Vessel
Services Act (l886) and various cargo preference laws should be retained unchanged
until a long term maritime policy, one which incorporates long term programs, is in
place. (6) This is nothing more than heeding the old adage." If a man does away with his
traditional way of living and throws away his good customs, he had better first make certain
he has something of value to replace them." (7)
*Establishing an "American desk," or its equivalent, at the U. S. Department of State.
This was a long time recommendation of the late Paul Hall, one of the most respected
maritime labor statesmen of this century. Historically, the State Department has treated
U.S. maritime interests as little more than bargaining chips when negotiating with
foreign governments over maritime as well as non-maritime issues. One would have to
go back to the 19th century to find any serious and comprehensive defense of American
maritime interests by a ranking State Department official.
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Comment
U.S. multimodal transportation companies. By definition, these firms would operate
different modes (water, rail, highway, air) under a single corporate roof. (8)
Government subsidy payments would be to the multimodal firm, not a shipping
subsidiary. The multimodal transport firm's obligation with respect to any government
subsidy would be to develop and operate one or more door to door international
logistics pipelines. Firm assets could include not only U.S.- flag vessels, land modes and
air systems but also foreign assets such as terminals, land transport, air carriers and
merchant ships. (9) Where U.S. ownership was restricted, equity and cooperative
arrangements would be negotiated to insure, to the greatest extent possible, efficient
door to door commercial service in peacetime and a rapid throughput of defense
shipments in time of national emergency (l0)
U.S. government policy is already moving in this direction. A provision of the proposed
Maritime Security Act of l995, not only makes the vessels of subsidized operators
available to the government in times of national emergency, but also support assets
such as containers and container handling equipment, terminals, as well as other
intermodal systems. The importance of intermodal systems was also recognized by
Congress when it passed the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. An
Office of Intermodalism was established in the Department of Transportation whose
function is to assist in developing efficient, national intermodal transportation systems.
Coordination and cooperation with the Department of Defense was an implicit given in
the legislation.
The recommendation of this paper simply carries the present intermodal development
effort to a logical end, i.e., active government participation in creating U.S.
owned/controlled international intermodal systems. An indirect but very important
benefit of encouraging the development of U.S. multimodal transport companies is
their potential financial strength, something too often lacking in stand alone shipping
firms.
Mission and responsibility of the Defense Logistics Agency. The United States has a long
history of mobilizing civilian transportation assets in time of war or national
emergency. Until World War II, civilian assets were the primary means of meeting
defense transport needs in time of conflict The Merchant Marine Act of l936 leaves no
doubt about the role private sector shipping was expected to play.
However, in the post World War II period (the Cold War), a greater and greater
reliance was placed on in-house, DOD assets. The reasoning was that the time necessary
to mobilize civilian assets, as was the case in previous conflicts, no longer existed or was
of such short duration as to be unacceptable to military planners. Thus, did private
sector sealift assets become a secondary or backup defense transport capability.
The end of the Cold War should have brought a top to bottom reexamination of the
role of privately owned and operated ships in meeting DOD defense requirements. It
did not.
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This paper urges that the peacetime management and operation of all DOD active
merchant-type tonnage be contracted out to U.S.-flag liner (multimodal transport
companies), tanker,. bulk and unscheduled operators, right down to the last asset that
floats. The MSC administered Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force of some 40 ships would be
the exception. The operational responsibility for this tonnage would be returned to the
several fleet commands. Special purpose shipping that might not be efficiently managed
in the private sector would become the responsibility of other agencies. e.g. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and U.S. Coast Guard. In every case,
however, the burden of proof would be on the government to show that government
management was more cost effective than private sector management. It might be
noted in this respect that the l972 joint Marad-Navy test of refueling underway Navy
combatants by a union-crewed, privately owned tanker (ST Erna Elizabeth) was
considered a success by then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Insofar as substituting black hulls for gray ones, the exercise came to naught.
The responsibility for insuring that former MSC sealift assets were maintained and
operated in a high state of readiness would fall to the DLA. Likewise, Maritime
Administration responsibilities with respect to insuring that private sector, militarily
useful ship assets be quickly mobilized in the event of a national emergency would also
be tasked to DLA. The Director of a reorganized DLA would be a civilian rather than a
uniformed flag officer of one of the services, as is the present case.
In summary, the Defense Logistics Agency would have the following additional
responsibilities.
1. Contracting out to the private sector the operation and management of:
*Strategic Sealift Forces
*Mission Support Forces
*Ready Reserve Force of the National Defense Reserve Fleet. (11)
2. Administering DOD liner shipping agreements, i.e., contracts with multimodal
transport companies operating liner services, or any liner company operating
independently of a multimodal transport firm.
3. Administering non-liner shipping agreements.
4. Administering operational subsidy agreements.
5. Administering the movement of all cargo preference and government impelled
cargo.
6. Periodically assessing the national security role of the U.S. flag, domestic fleet
and making recommendations in this regard.
7. Recommend the amount and kind of DOD funding for private sector sealift
enhancement. Should a subsidy be needed to insure the availability of
non-maritime multimodal transport assets, e.g., railroads, such a
recommendation would also be a DLA responsibility. Federal expenditures in
support of private sector transportation assets needed in time of war or national
emergency would be evaluated in the context of all DOD expenditures. For
example: Is the national security better served by the purchase of "X" number of
main battle tanks or earmarking the same amount of money to keep "X"
number of militarily useful, U.S. flag vessels at sea. Explicitly including sealift
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(and other) private sector assets in determining what defense purchases will be
made and what foregone, is an exercise long past due.
There are several compelling reasons for increasing/revising the mission of DLA. First,
the agency has no orientation to a particular service. Historically, it is an agency
oriented toward customer service, one vital in establishing door to door service on a
worldwide basis, and particularly in very competitive markets. Moreover, customer
service is a concept understood and appreciated by the private sector. Second,
combining two agencies (Marad and MSC) is nominally a cost effective move, and
should be even more so when phased into an existing agency. (l2) Third, the assertion
that funds for sealift are, in fact, defense expenditures, would be more compelling and
better understood when the administering agency is a part of DOD and not the
Department of the Navy. A spillover benefit would be a fresh start in relations between
DOD and U.S. flag operators. In the past, disputes between MSC and operators over
rates and conditions for moving defense cargo were, often as not, bitter and
acrimonious.
In summary, it would be DLA's responsibility to insure that private sector transport
assets are in place and readily available in a contingency, national emergency or war.
Administering agreements (subsidy or otherwise) whose purpose is to insure that these
assets are in place would be tasked to that agency. Stated another way...if
recommendations of this paper are followed, DLA responsibility would be to insure
that U.S. multimodal transportation firms, operating private sector transport assets
offering service over international logistics pipelines, remain economically viable...at the
least cost to government.
The mission of the Military Transport Management Command (MTMC) is to decide
how military traffic moves and how to respond to DOD customer requirements. MTMC
is the interface between DOD users and commercial carriers. The basic mission of
MTMC would not change. It would still continue in its role of DOD's freight forwarder
and travel agent.
The major responsibility of the Air Mobility Command (AMC) is to manage
DOD-owned airlift assets (C-130, 141, C-5, KC-10, etc. aircraft) in peacetime. This
responsibility does not change. AMC would also retain the responsibility for
administering and activating the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program. There should
not be any conflict between AMC's role with respect to aircraft in the CRAF program
and DLA's role in insuring that multimodal transportation firms operating
CRAF-enrolled planes remain economically viable.
The role of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in peacetime, in this
author's opinion, remains unclear. In a war or national emergency where the President
invokes emergency war powers, there is logic in ALL U.S. transport assets (private and
DOD owned) falling under USTRANSCOM direction. One analogy is how the Cherokee
Nation defined responsibility in time of peace and war. In time of war, peacetime
government was replaced by a war chief.
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The education and training of licensed and unlicensed merchant mariners. In l996,
federal support for graduating "X" number of merchant marine officers into an industry
that requires a fraction of that number, simply cannot be justified. The estimated federal
expenditure to operate the Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York is
some $30 million while federal support of the six state maritime academies approaches
$l0 million.
Justifying such federal expenditures is a heroic undertaking, if it can be done at all. (l3)
Politically it is another matter, particularly with respect to the state maritime academies.
The electoral votes of these six states-Maine, Massachusetts, California, Texas, New
York, Michigan-represent the lion's share of the electoral votes needed to elect a
president. Of all maritime reform proposals, ending these federal subsidies will be the
greatest challenge of all.
The training of future unlicensed merchant mariners and the upgrading of present
seamen should be a recognized union responsibility with respect to manning ships
under union agreements. Fortunately, such training (by unions) already exists. (The
Harry Lundeberg School of Seamanship operated by the Seafarer's International Union
is an excellent example of private sector initiative in the area of maritime education.)
The training of non-union merchant seamen, as is the case now, would remain in the
private sector.
An opportunity that should be considered by American maritime unions is to offer
training to seafarers from developing countries. Tuition would be set to cover all costs.
Whether or not American seamen unions would accept such a role, such training will
take place somewhere at some time given an ever growing worldwide movement to
increase crew qualifications.
A task of the Defense Logistics Agency would be to maintain a current list (pool) of
inactive seamen who would be willing, and have the necessary skills, to man merchant
ships in a contingency when demand exceeded available supply. Providing the
necessary data to DLA would be an industry-wide responsibility. When pool or skill
levels fell to a point where the national security was put at risk, DLA would coordinate
the corrective private sector actions needed to address the problem.
Licensed and unlicensed mariners, union and non-union alike, must be recognized as
partners in any federally funded maritime support program, not just in name but in
substance as well. Passage of Public Law 95-202 in l989, legislation which provided
benefits to seamen similar to those who served in the armed forces during World War
II, should end any debate about the commitment and dedication of merchant seamen in
time of war or national emergency. That it took Congress almost 40 years to act only
underscores the need for a greater understanding on the part of the public regarding
the role of merchant ships and merchant mariners in time of conflict.
Deregulation of ocean shipping. Deregulation of ocean shipping will bring essentially
the same benefits to the economy as did deregulation of air, rail and truck transport. In
a word-more competition. More competition will not only improve service but rates
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should fall as well. A temporary downside will be that weaker firms will not survive an
industry shakeout. Some American jobs will be lost. In the long run, however, the
surviving carriers will be stronger. Deregulation will also encourage carriers to
negotiate global shipping alliances, i.e. share shipping assets. One such alliance is
Sealand Services and Maersk. Their combined fleets total l70 vessels. Deregulation is an
essential step in creating worldwide logistics pipelines, as suggested in this paper.
Harmonizing U.S. and international safety standards. In l994, the House passed the
Coast Guard Regulatory Reform Act. However, a similar bill failed in the Senate. The
House bill aimed to eliminate U.S. requirements that exceed the standards of traditional
maritime nations. Vessel construction standards is the area in which the greatest cost
differential exists.
As the single nation at one end of the world's largest set of trading routes, the United
States has the ability to influence, if not command, acceptable safety standards for
vessels operating in the American trades. The recent review by the U.S. Coast Guard of
safety regulations (requirements) with respect to over l00 foreign flag cruise ship that
annually call at American ports, is a case in point.
The argument that should the United States sign off on international safety standards
and that this will somehow increase the risk to cargo, passengers, and crew, is a
question better left to marine underwriters than political pressure groups.
Maintain indirect maritime support programs until a long range, enduring maritime
policy is in place. The economic benefit to the nation as a whole should the plug be
pulled on the Jones Act, the Passenger Vessel Services Act of l886, and the various cargo
preference laws, is small in the context of a $7.13 trillion GDP (March l995) and the
amount spent annually on agricultural subsidies. In terms of government outlays, cargo
preference costs of $200 million pale beside annual direct and indirect agricultural
subsidies of some $40 billion. (l4)
While it is undisputed that cargo preference laws (particularly food aid programs) add
to the landed cost of food shipments, somewhere between 11-l4 percent of the total
program cost, loss of this cargo would cause the pool of merchant mariners to shrink
significantly. For as the active pool shrinks, so does the inactive pool that would be
called upon to man reserve and prepositioned ships in a contingency. No argument is
made that any great part of agricultural exports is moved in militarily useful ships.
In l994 the U.S. General Accounting Office sponsored a workshop on crewing Ready
Reserve Force ships. The workshop agreed that the key to crewing RRF vessels was to
maintain a viable U.S. merchant marine industry.
Effective U.S. controlled ships. The idea of U.S. owned, foreign flag shipping serving
U.S. national interests has been around a long time. In the run up to American entry
into World War II, it was one of several ways to avoid U.S. neutrality acts and aid Great
Britain. The problem, however, (which most analysts ignore) is that there is a difference
between serving a national interest and a defense interest.
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The presence of U.S. owned, foreign flag shipping in many trades keeps rates
competitive which in turn means lower consumer prices. Having U.S. tonnage
registered under the flags of small, generally developing nations, gives American policy
makers leverage in dealing with those nations. Finally, past restrictions on overseas
investment by U.S. firms has generally been counter-productive in the long run. All of
the above, however, does not add up to a "defense interest."
The EUSC idea was flawed from the start, mainly because (l) there was no guarantee
that foreign crews would continue to man the ships in conflict situations, which in turn
raised the questions of how to crew these ships and the time to crew the ships should
foreign crews refuse to sail them; (2) EUSC vessels, for the most part, are only
marginally militarily useful; and (3) not-withstanding written agreements, many flag of
convenience governments are hesitant to renounce sovereignty over their shipping,
particularly when the ships were to be used in politically contentious conflicts, conflicts
which many times pitted non-aligned, developing nations against developed and
wealthier western nations.
Ranking military officers and knowledgeable maritime commentators have always
questioned the value of EUSC tonnage. Since, however, there was no significant outlay
of defense funds, civilian officials at DOD were content to leave well enough alone and
endorse the concept, even if not in ringing terms.
Aircraft
A problem that American military planners must consider in the next century is not
only assuring that there will be a sufficient number of U.S. flag, militarily useful ships,
but a sufficient number of long range, private sector U.S. flag, militarily useful aircraft.
In l996, U.S. flag air carriers operating on international routes are competitive, in fact,
too competitive in the view of many foreign governments.
In the last six years, passenger traffic between the United States and foreign destinations
increased 47 percent, while domestic traffic increased by only six percent. U.S. airlines
increased their share of foreign traffic from 49 percent in l980 to 54 percent in l993. A
European Union study concluded that the operating costs of major European carriers in
l992 were 50 percent higher than their American competitors. (15)
Given the above, there would seem little to worry about. The present Civil Reserve Air
Fleet (CRAF) program insures that approximately 200 U.S. flag, private sector
passenger planes and l50 cargo aircraft will be made available in an emergency. (16)
However, it is well to remember that 40 years ago (l956) the U.S. privately owned,
foreign trade merchant marine numbered 608 vessels including 3l combination
passenger-cargo ships and the liners SS America and SS United States. The privately
owned, U.S. domestic fleet included 396 vessels. Seafaring jobs numbered
approximately 57,000. (17) Liner share of U.S. foreign trade (tons) was almost 39
percent.
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In its issue of July l994, the authoritative publication Marine Log listed 262 militarily
useful domestic and foreign trade vessels (500 grt and over) operating under the
American flag. Included were 86 containerships, 16 RO/ROs, 25 general cargo, 10 barge
carriers and 125 tankers. (18) U.S. government owned tonnage is not included in the
above, e.g. RRF vessels. In 1994 U.S. liner share of American foreign trade (tons) was
about l6 percent. Total seafaring jobs were less than l4,000. Jobs on vessels of 1,000
gross registered tons (grt) and over were estimated at 9,000.
In 1996, the trend is toward a greater and greater number of cooperative arrangements,
including equity agreements, between U.S. and foreign flag airlines. Appendix C
summarizes this trend. The question is-will operating costs of Third World, developing
nation carriers-in particular crew costs-be significantly less than those of the United
States? Recall that Third World nations forced a UN sponsored liner cargo sharing
agreement upon traditional maritime nations. At some time in the future, will they
demand a greater presence in international aviation? Should this occur, all the pieces
will be in place for the emergence of U.S. owned, "flag of convenience" airlines.
At its annual conference in l994, the International Civil Aviation Organization discussed
the likelihood of aircraft being placed under flags of convenience.
Developing and supporting financially strong U.S. multimodal transportation firms,
which include airlines, will go a long way to insure that operating subsidies for U.S. air
carriers will not become necessary, as is now the case with American foreign trade
shipping. It is a defensive strategy that is worthy of consideration.
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PART II
SHIPYARDS
Historically, there have always been many players with respect to forming and
sustaining a U.S. maritime policy. Shipyards are one of the most important.
From the beginning, government support for a merchant marine was in one way or
another tied to the well being of American shipyards. Provisions in the Merchant
Marine Acts of l920 and l936 tightly bound the two groups together, i.e., support for
one was tied to support for the other. Ships receiving mail or operating subsidies in
foreign trade or operating in the protected domestic trades, were required to be
American built, and with few exceptions, repaired in U.S. shipyards. Most ships carrying
preference cargoes were constructed in American yards.
In 1981 the requirement that U.S. flag, foreign trade vessels receiving an operating
differential subsidy (ODS) be American built ended. Subsidized operators could now
purchase their ships in low cost foreign shipyards. Vessels operating in the domestic
trades were still required to be constructed and repaired in U.S. yards.
A major part of the rationale for ending the tie in between shipyards and U.S.-flag,
foreign trade shipping lines was the on going buildup of the American Navy begun in
the late 1970s. President Reagan's goal of a 600 ship Navy and with no expectation that
the Cold War would end quickly, seemed to assure an adequate shipbuilding base. And
while shipyards continued to protest their exclusion from U.S. commercial building,
they met with little success.
At the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, several trends were evident. First, operating
differential subsidies were being increasingly challenged as wage differentials between
U.S. and foreign operators widened. Second, American shipyard labor costs were
approaching equity with European and Japanese yards and actually were less in some.
Third, the risk of losing an adequate shipyard mobilization base was being recognized
as a legitimate concern in defense planning. And fourth, the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991, hurried along an already begun process of scaling back the size of the Navy. A
Navy of some 350-75 ships was now considered adequate. This downsizing took its toll
on an already financially weakened shipyard industry.
At the beginning of the 1990s, shipyard lobbying efforts turned away from trying to
restore a tie in between a declining foreign trade, U.S. flag fleet and American
shipyards. The message to Congress and the executive branch was now-do something
about foreign government subsidies to their shipyards, particularly Asian yards. The
argument was that American shipyards could, in fact, compete in a number of areas
given a level playing field. The second and third prongs of U.S. shipyard strategy were
to defend American cabotage laws, and to keep in place and expand a recent change in
maritime policy which allowed the government to offer federal loan guarantees to
foreign ship operators who purchased vessels in American yards. (19)
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Issues
In l995, shipyard issues before Congress included:
(1) Whether or not U.S. shipyards building under the government's loan guarantee
program (Title XI, Merchant Marine Act of l936, as amended) should be required to
purchase major ship components from U.S. suppliers. This issue split the nation's
shipyards. The larger yards, represented by the American Shipbuilding Association,
favored allowing foreign components to be counted as part of a ship's construction cost
eligible for Title XI financing. The more numerous smaller yards, represented by the
Shipbuilders Council of America, favored keeping the requirement of American
components.
(2) Whether or not to implement the recently concluded OECD ban on shipyard
subsidies. In July l994, the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and
Norway agreed to end shipyard subsidies by January l, l996. Under terms of the
agreement, the conditions for financing construction under Title XI will be less
favorable. The duration of Title XI loans will be cut from 20-25 years to l2 years and
coverage reduced from 87 to 75 percent. The six large shipyards, represented by the
American Shipbuilding Association, favor renegotiating the OECD agreement; the 40
some odd smaller yards and suppliers represented by the Shipbuilders Council of
America are content with the present terms of the agreement.
(3) Whether or not American cabotage laws should be repealed or modified. The year
l995 saw a major effort in the Congress to do away with or amend these laws, laws
which require tonnage in the domestic trades be built in American yards. (20)
(4) Closure of naval shipyards as authorized by the Base Closure and Realignment Acts
of 1991 and 1993 and recommended by the Base Closure Commission. States and cities
(ports) adversely affected by closures fought to reverse closure orders but at the end of
1995 none were successful. Yards recommended for closure are located at Charleston,
SC, Philadelphia, PA, and Long Beach, CA. The major effect on communities where
yards are to be closed is loss of jobs. Naval shipyards historically have been labor
intense operations.
(5) Export of U.S. built warships and export of naval technology.
Comment
*American shipyards, small and large, naval oriented or not, repair or build, have a
window of opportunity to once again become players in world markets. Being allowed
to include foreign components in their builds without penalty is essential for long run
shipyard profitability, for both large and small yards. If American components are price
and quality competitive there will be no problem (The transportation charge for foreign
components is still a part of delivered price) If there is a concern that foreign suppliers
may be subsidized by their governments, firm and decisive action by the Assistant
Secretary of Commerce For Trade and Development (Office of Trade Representative) is
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the remedy. The American desk at the State Department would package such action in
diplomatic language but also make clear American resolve to defend its shipyard
supplier base. Moreover, there is no bar to U.S. yards acquiring competitive and
profitable American suppliers, nor should there be any restriction on American yards
acquiring foreign suppliers. Given the membership of the Shipbuilders Council, their tilt
toward legislative protection for their supplier members is understandable but flawed
in terms of achieving a long term viability for all U.S. shipyards.
*The OECD agreement is probably the best obtainable for the United States. The
argument of the larger shipyards that too much was given away to obtain it neglects
the fact that foreign signatory governments also had to be responsive to pressures
from their shipyard constituents. A better way to look at the issue is to ask: What if the
OECD agreement fails of ratification? The world shipbuilding industry is then back to
square one. Shipyard subsidies will be the name of the game. And it is here that U.S.
yards will lose given the fact that a balanced budget-minded Congress will hardly
support a subsidy bidding war. Not so, however, with competitor nations. Historically,
socialist and quasi-marketplace countries have no reservation when it comes to
subsidizing key industrial sectors of their economies. The quicker American yards
accept OECD provisions and position themselves to compete in worldwide markets, the
better. Instead of the larger yards insisting on a phase-in of the OECD agreement
together with some kind of transition subsidy, their emphasis should be on improving
productivity. It is not enough to point to the large productivity-increasing investments
already made. America's competitors are still ahead in too many critical areas. (21)
*In 1996, there is an oversupply of shipbuilding and repair capability in the United
States. One indicator of this overcapacity is the difficulty encountered by Charleston,
South Carolina in its attempt to interest private sector investment (foreign and
domestic) in the former Charleston Naval Shipyard, i.e., investment as a shipyard.
While a few more shipyards can be expected to close, the industry is approaching the
point where a long term, sufficiently funded Title XI loan guarantee program will be
able to insure an adequate shipbuilding/repair mobilization base.
*While the ultimate purpose of those who insist on repealing or amending U.S.
cabotage laws may be defensible on economic grounds, in l996 their strategy is
questionable. Insistence on going head to head with maritime supporters
(Congressional Republicans, Democrats, the DOD, and the President) at a time when a
U.S.-flag sealift capability is close to extinction stands little chance of success.
Reform of U.S. cabotage laws will only come about when a long range, enduring
maritime policy is in place and generally accepted by the American electorate. The
defining moment will be when there is a sufficient amount of (militarily useful) private
sector, U.S. flag tonnage available to meet DOD's worst case scenarios, together with a
sufficient pool of U.S. seamen, not only to man this tonnage, but also reserve and
prepositioned vessels. Then and only then can negotiations begin to reform U.S.
cabotage laws.
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*A long run goal would be to close all but two naval shipyards, leaving one on each
coast. In l996, however , this is not politically feasible, given a slowed economy and
continued corporate downsizing, and such an effort would only complicate efforts to
enact a comprehensive maritime policy. (22) It is not too early, however, to examine the
option. The bottom line is-can privately owned U.S. shipyards be completely responsive
to defenses needs in both peace and war. If so, naval shipyards should go the way of
DOD's in-house merchant marine, i.e., no longer exist. The question has been asked
before.
*The United States has a long history of exporting arms and defense technologies to
friendly countries. Stinger missiles, F-16s and AWACs, to name but three high tech
systems. Of the three services, the Navy has been the most reluctant to agree to foreign
military sales (FMS) of its high tech hardware and software. Rather, the Navy
preference is to sell older versions of technology after newer systems come on line., e.g.
FF-G (Perry class) guided missile frigates and the original Aegis combat systems. Navy
refusal to agree to the sale of U.S. designed diesel submarines (assuming American
yards are willing to build them) is a case in point (23) Foreign sales of the F/A-18
Hornet on the one hand, and an almost paranoid resistance to sale of diesel submarines,
on the other, is logically inconsistent. And the more so given a legislative mandate that
major U.S. surface combatants and submarines be nuclear powered. If the Navy must
worry about anything, the greater threat is that Russian nuclear submarine technology
may fall into unfriendly hands. Russia has already sold Kilo-type diesel electric attack
submarines to China, India, and Iran.
Conclusion
To the greatest extent possible, certainty must replace uncertainty with respect to
developing an enduring maritime policy. In this respect, some things are more doable
than other. Less contentious issues should be acted upon first. They include:
(1) Ratify the OECD agreement as it stands. The sooner the terms under which Title XI
loan guarantees can be made, the better. While U.S. yards will lose some contracts due
to less favorable loan guarantee conditions, long run planning will be more certain with
respect to where (which niche markets) U.S. yards are competitive. Concurrently, when
funding Title XI, Congress should err on the high side when estimating demand for
loan guarantees. (24)
(2) Settle the question of how much a differential is acceptable between foreign and U.S.
ocean transportation costs with respect to the movement of agricultural preference
cargo. It should be kept in mind that the trade off is not between tonnage and the extra
cost, but between having an adequate pool of merchant seamen available in time of
emergency and the extra cost. A suggested 10 percent cap on any excess seems
reasonable.
(3) U.S. safety standards should be harmonized with international standards as quickly
as possible. While the l995 agreement between the Coast Guard and the American
Bureau of Shipping to reduce the effect of costly U.S. regulations and thereby increase
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the competitiveness of U.S. flag ships and shipyards is an excellent beginning, it is still
only a beginning. (25) To give the necessary certainty to the maritime industry, changes
in requirements should be set in legal concrete, not pilot agreements which can later be
canceled or modified.
(4) Maritime supporters in the Congress and the Clinton administration should make it
abundantly clear that now is not the time to consider reform of U.S. cabotage laws.
Republicans should make it clear that a change in administrations, should it come about,
will not consider such reforms until a permanent maritime program is enacted into law
and long range funding guaranteed. Those seeking reform of our domestic navigation
laws should be invited to sign on in developing an enduring maritime policy, one which
at some time in the future may incorporate changes in U.S. cabotage laws.
(5) American seamen unions must be prepared to contribute to a long run, permanent
maritime policy. One contribution that can be phased in is to bring American crew sizes
into line with international norms that do not compromise vessel safety. Future seaman
unions will be very akin to the old craft unions of the former American Federation of
Labor (AFL). In that era, skill was the criteria for membership, not how many jobs
unions could create.
What the unions have right to expect in return is an end to critically comparing U.S.
wages with those of foreign flag operators. If it is granted, as argued in this report, that
government funding of a foreign trade merchant marine, one suitable for sealift
purposes in a contingency, is a national defense expenditure, then wage comparisons, if
made at all, should be between foreign uniformed military personnel and U.S. military
personnel on the one hand, and foreign and U.S. seamen on the other. When all benefits
are factored into American military personnel costs, the percentage difference between
American and foreign seagoing wages will seem to be quite reasonable. Appendix D
summarizes differences between U.S. and foreign seamen wages.
Second, seamen's unions and licensed officer unions must settle the issue of licensed
American officers serving on re-flagged U.S. ships. In economic terms, employing U.S.
officers on foreign flag vessels is a "Pareto" optimum solution, that is, one party gains
while no party loses. It is also worth noting that the national security is well served by
having U.S. officers on foreign flag vessels, particularly on those vessels that are part of
U.S. multimodal transportation companies offering service over worldwide logistics
pipelines.
American unlicensed seagoing unions, however, have a right to expect that the
American government will actively support programs to insure that (1) foreign seamen
serving on re-flagged vessels meet high-end professional standards and (2) that
reflagged vessels be operated in strict compliance with international safety standards. (26)
(6) End the Effective U.S. Control (EUSC) concept with respect to American owned
foreign flag shipping. The concept is part of the underbrush that must be cleared away
if an enduring maritime policy has any chance of success. As long as the EUSC concept
is around, those who question the need for a strong U.S.-flag presence in international
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ocean commerce, will have still another argument (fallacious as it might be) to justify
their position. The Cold War is over. And like the FMC, if there ever was justification
for the EUSC concept, its time has past.
Longer term goals include:
Creating U.S. multimodal transportation companies wherein ocean shipping is but a
part of the system, should be considered as an ultimate end for maritime policy makers,
not keeping at sea a "sufficient number" of militarily useful ships engaged in foreign
trade operated by stand-alone shipping companies. (27)
To emphasize the point for developing U.S. owned/controlled worldwide logistics
pipelines, consider several exercises. First, have a DOD customer ship the maximum size
package that Federal Express will accept for a guaranteed two day delivery to a foreign
destination over 3000 miles distant. Ship the same package via DOD in-house transport.
Compare cost and time. Second, have a DOD customer on the east coast offer CSX a 20
foot container destined for an inland point in Asia three or four thousand miles distant
and make the same comparisons. Many other comparison-exercises can be made,
particularly those of interest to defense planners. A February 1996 U.S. General
Accounting Office report ...."Streamlining of the U.S. Transporation Command is Needed,"
is instructive in this respect. The report notes:
Defense transportation costs are substantially higher than necessary. DOD customers
frequently pay prices for transportation services that are double or triple the cost of the
basic transportation. For example, customers may pay MTMC and MSC $3,800 to
arrange movement of a container load of cargo by commercial carriers from California
to Korea; however, DOD is charged only $1,250 by the commercial carrier for this
service.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that the success of multimodal
transportation firms depends on DOD's unequivocal commitment to use U.S. private
sector transportation systems wherever they exist and to encourage their establishment
where they do not exist. (28)
(7) The Federal Maritime Commission should be "sunsetted." It is an agency of another
time. With the exception of the FMC itself, there is broad agreement that the agency has
outlived its usefulness. (The first Reagan transition team gave serious consideration to
sunsetting the agency.) Putting off final action only increases uncertainty in a maritime
world where U.S. operators and shippers need to know the rules of the game, not
speculate on what they might or might not be at some time down the line.
(8) Merging MSC and Marad responsibilities for merchant-type shipping into the
Defense Logistics Agency will be equally as contentious as doing away with
government subsidies for merchant marine officer training. But like the multimodal
transportation concept, it is a goal that must be pursued. Either the United States relies
on the private sector for its merchant ship-type sealift requirements or it does not. As
long as a nationalized merchant marine exists of whatever size and configuration, so
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too will remain the long ago argument put forth before Congress in 1950 by Admiral
William Callaghan, then Commander of the Military Sea Transport Service.
Senator Magnuson. You feel that the Navy must continue to operate a certain portion of
military merchant marine.
Admiral Callaghan. I do, definitely.
Senator Magnuson. How long would you say that should continue?
Admiral Callaghan. I should say that would continue until the world situation
approximated that perhaps in the early twenties or early thirties before the threat of a
second world war faced us. (29)
A fair question to ask when considering merging MSC and Marad sealift responsibilities
into the Defense Logistics Agency is: Why not place the administration of transportation
assets, including sealift, with Marad? It is a civilian agency, which seems to be much
more compatible with the arguments put forth in this paper.
The answer is straight forward. For a long time, the rationale for government
subsidies/protection for U.S. flag merchant shipping has been the national security.
Nothing more or less. If the rationale is to be accepted by the public, then the
administration of federally funded programs in support of a merchant marine, will be
better understood when the administering agency is a part of the Department of
Defense. It is important to note, however, that the above recommendation will only
succeed when there is no competition between DOD in-house transportation assets and
those in the private sector.
While it might be expected that the Department of Defense would welcome major
responsibility for insuring the availability of an adequate sealift capability, such is
unlikely. Far better from DOD's point of view is to have a militarily useful merchant
marine funded outside the DOD budget. Service chiefs will vigorously argue that there
are more than enough trade-offs to contend with in framing a defense budget without
adding another contender for limited funds.

A Final Comment
The year l996 may be the last clear chance for a U.S. flag merchant marine capable of
meeting our present national security needs and those on into the 21st century. It is a
challenge not to be taken lightly. Appendix E discusses the "last clear chance" rule as
applied in admiralty cases and makes the analogy between the rule and the
responsibility of Congress.
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END NOTES
l. A mail subsidy bill to support American, foreign trade shipping in the North Atlantic
was passed in 1845. Legislation in 1789, 1790, and 18l7 effectively limited the American
domestic trades to U.S. flag, U.S. built vessels. The prohibition against foreign-flag
vessels in the domestic trades was restated in Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of
l920, the so-called Jones Act.
2. Major maritime support legislation in the post World War II period included the Ship
Sales Act of l946, the Cargo Preference Act of l954, and the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
In 1974 and 1977 legislation requiring a certain percent of U.S. oil imports be carried on
U.S. flag tankers was first vetoed by President Ford and later failed in the House of
Representatives. The 300 ship build provision in the 1970 act was never realized.
3. The proposed Maritime Security Act of l995 provided approximately $1 billion in
operating subsidies over a l0 year period. During the first five years, the subsidy would
be $2.5 million per ship, dropping to $2 million per ship in the last five years. A $75
million "termination reserve fund" was included should Congress fail to appropriate
monies in future years.
4. Almost certain is that funding for any new maritime support program in 1996 must
be preceded by savings in existing (maritime) programs. If such savings can be
identified by maritime supporters and the savings realized, then, to that extent, the
odds for enacting and funding new program(s) improve.
5. The Act to Provide For Ocean Mail Service Between U.S. and Foreign Ports and To
PromoteCommerce (3 March 1891) required shipping service be maintained on specified
international mail routes as a condition for government financial support. The
Merchant Marine Act of l936 substituted "essential trade routes" for "mail routes."
6. In 1983, 1985 and 1986 this author argued for various modifications in the Jones Act
and suggested some possible trade-offs to increase overall transport efficiency. See:
The U.S. Merchant Marine: In Search of An Enduring Maritime Policy (U.S. Naval Institute
Press, l983), Domestic Shipping in American Ships: Jones Act Costs, Benefits and Options
(American Enterprise Institute, l985) and The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry: Past, Present
and Future (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986).
The past decade has not been the best of times for U.S. foreign trade liner shipping. In
1996, Jones Act shipping accounts for a larger share of U.S. flag, militarily useful
tonnage than in 1985. Thus, while the case for a review of U.S. cabotage laws remains
persuasive, now is not the time.
7. Basuto proverb. Quoted in Something of Value by Robert Ruark (Garden City, N.J.:
Doubleday, 1955).
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8. Three options are available when establishing door to door transport services. One is
for different modal assets to be owned by a single firm (e.g. CSX Corporation). A
second is individual firms enter into cooperative agreements with respect to intermodal
movements. (In the United States there are numerous examples). A third is a
combination of the first and second (e.g. Norfolk-Southern Corporation). From A DOD
view, multimodal ownership is preferable. From a foreign government point of view
and probably a U.S. Department of Justice (Anti-Trust Division), viewpoint, cooperative
arrangements are preferable.
Some of the world's most efficient multimodal transport firms combine air and surface
modes in their cargo movements. In the United States examples are Federal Express
and United Parcel Services. The Evergreen Group in the Republic of China on Taiwan
operates containerships (the world's largest fleet), terminals, land transport and an
airline under one corporate roof. An Evergreen subsidiary manufactures containers.
9. The trans-ocean leg of the logistics system would be restricted to U.S. flag vessels.
Waivers would be granted only when no U.S. flag ship was available.
10. Door to door service from the United States to a foreign inland destination as
described, would of necessity, be feasible only in friendly nations with a history of
respect for contracts and private property or in nations formally allied with the United
States.
11. Remaining National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) tonnage would be disposed of as
quickly as possible.
12. The estimated total budget authority (1996) for the Maritime Administration is $350
million. The 1996 budget for the Military Sealift Command is in excess of $2 billion for
all operations which includes fleet support auxiliaries. The Ready Reserve Force, now
funded in Marad's budget, will be funded by DOD in 1996.
13. Past justifications have included the argument that Kings Point and the state
academies turn out graduates that not only serve at sea but in shoreside
maritime-related jobs. Ignored is the fact that hundreds of the nation's business schools
are equally qualified to supply the shoreside maritime industry with managers (a
worthwhile General Accounting Office exercise would be to survey maritime industry
jobs in terms of where industry managers received their education). A second
argument put forward is that maritime academy graduates are a source of naval
reserve officers. Ignored is the fact that Naval Reserve ROTC units at many of the
nation's universities do the same thing and that a downsized Navy can offer active duty
to only a fraction of the annual output of naval reserve officers.
14. The $40 billion includes government subsidies for nutritional needs (food stamps
and the school lunch program). In 1993, approximately $13 billion was paid directly to
farmers, including $1.2 billion in export subsidies. The U.S. General Accounting Office
estimates that $200 million per year is the cost of agricultural cargo preference
legislation, that is, the excess cost of using U.S. flag ships. One proposal being discussed
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is placing a l0 percent cap on any excess cost.
15. U.S. General Accounting Office, International Aviation: Airline Alliances Produce
Benefits But Effect on Competition is Uncertain (Washington, D.C., U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1995), pp. 2, l0, l2.
16. Airlines that participate in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program are required
to commit a specified number and type of aircraft should a contingency occur in which
surge airlift is needed. In return, these airlines are eligible to contract for DOD air cargo
movements. In the l991 Gulf War, participating CRAF planes carried 65 percent of the
troops and 25 percent of the freight that moved by air.
17. All 1956 data is from: Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime
Administration, l956. Appendices A, C, and F and Financial Statement, Exhibit 2.
18. Marine Log (July 1994) pp. 45-60.
19. Loan guarantees are authorized under Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of l936, as
amended.
20. In 1995, Representative Walter B. Jones, Jr. (R-NC) sought support for legislation
that would allow foreign flag vessels into U.S. domestic ocean and intercoastal
waterway trades. Inland water operators would still be protected under Jones Act
provisions. Foreign flag liner operators would be required to employ U.S. crews and be
subject to current American law, e.g., tax and environmental laws. U.S. flag carriers
would be allowed to purchase foreign built ships.
21. A 1994 report sponsored by the National Shipbuilding Research Program looked at
five American yards, four European yards and one Asian yard. It found that American
yards were behind their competitors in areas such as engine room machinery and hull
engineering. Design capability and marketing ability were also areas in which U.S. yards
were found to be generally non-competitive.
22. In 1978 this author argued for closing naval shipyards and relying on the private
sector for the great majority of naval conversion, alteration and repair (CAR) work.
See: "Is There A Future For Naval Shipyards?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, l04:30.
23. Equally important is the advantage of compatibility of systems as between the U.S.
and allied navies. Foreign military sales should also be viewed as an opportunity to
lower procurement costs (extend production runs) and at the same time help insure an
adequate shipyard mobilization base.
24. As of May 1, l995, Marine Log (June l995) listed 25 Title XI applications (69) ships
with proposed loan guarantees of $l,828,352,387.
25. The American Bureau of Shipping-Coast Guard agreement allows U.S. flag vessels to
be certified as being in compliance with American law by complying with ABS,
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international rules, and a supplementary set of Coast Guard requirements that are not
required by ABS.
26. Training for foreign seamen serving on re-flagged vessels at union schools is a
concept deserving consideration. While American operators would probably be initially
hostile to having their lower-cost, non-union, crews trained in a union environment,
there are still wide areas where mutually beneficial arrangements could be made. The
concept also fits into the notion of developing U.S. multimodal companies which include
foreign as well as American transport components.
27. A major criticism of the proposed Maritime Security Act of l995 is that the number of
(50) militarily useful ships to be funded is driven more by budget considerations than
sealift requirements. It is a fatal flaw and one that can legitimately termed penny-wise
and pound foolish. The acid test of how many "militarily useful" merchant ships are
needed to meet a worst case scenario can be found by (1) specifying the sealift
requirement, and (2) plotting the worldwide location of all currently active, militarily
useful ships on a randomly selected day. Estimate the time it would take for the needed
tonnage to be ready to load military cargo at DOD designated ports. Include ships of
the Ready Reserve Force. This exercise was undertaken by the author in 1975 while
employed by the U.S. General Accounting Office. It demonstrated conclusively that
numbers alone are not the determining factor when estimating tonnage requirements
in a fast breaking military contingency.
28. Within 10 years, if not sooner, there will be four, possibly six major railroads
operating in the United States--two or three western roads and two or three eastern
roads Two transcontinental roads will come in time. In a word, mergers in the railroad
industry are not over. Large, financially strong railroads will be the base upon which
U.S. owned/controlled, multimodal transportation firms, serving global markets, will
rest.
29. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Hearings,
Merchant Marine Study and Investigations (Transportation of Cargoes by the Military)
81st Cong., 2d sess. l950, p. 1071.
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APPENDIX A
The Players
Historically, there have always been numerous players with respect to forming and
sustaining a U.S. maritime policy. They are commented upon below but not necessarily
in order of importance.
Vessel Operators
U.S. flag, U.S. crewed. These vessels are militarily useful in the context of l996 sealift
requirements. Included are containerships, barge carriers, RO-ROs, general cargo,
small-medium size tankers, and passenger vessels.
U.S. flag, U.S. crewed. These vessels support the national economy but would not be
requisitioned or requested in most conflict scenarios. Vessels include bulk carriers,
combination bulk carriers (OBOs), Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCC), Ultra Large
Crude Carriers (ULCC), and Liquid Natural Gas Carriers (LNGs).
U.S. owned, foreign crewed. These vessels are registered under select foreign flags and
are referred to as Effective U.S. Controlled Shipping (EUSC). Agreements between
owners and the U.S. government contemplate return of these ships to U.S. control in a
national emergency.
U.S. owned, foreign crewed. These vessels are registered under foreign flags but are not
covered by an agreement with the U.S. government and would not normally be subject
to requisition in a national emergency Seizing vessels under wartime authority or
chartering vessels from this fleet is always an option.
U.S. government-owned (National Defense Reserve Fleet). Some 290-300
government-owned ships located on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific coasts. These vessels
could meet some sealift requirements except for the long activation time required to
make them seaworthy. These ships are not factored into any current contingency plans.
U.S. government-owned. (Ready Reserve Force [RRF]) This fleet presently consists of
89 militarily useful ships located along the three U.S. coasts. They are kept in varying
degrees of readiness, that is, available within 4, 5, l0, 20, or 30 days of a mobilization
notice. Thirty two ships will be available within 5 days. Ships in the highest state of
readiness will be maintained in a reduced operating status (ROS) by a crew of ten.
Ready Reserve Force vessels were broken out in the Persian Gulf War (1991), the Haiti
deployment (l994) and the Bosnian conflict (l995).
U.S. government-owned. (Military Sealift Command) This agency is a component of the
U.S. Transportation Command and provides ocean transport services to the
Department of Defense. In addition to its fleet of 139 merchant-type ships, MSC
operates logistics support vessels that support deployed naval combatants. [Fleet oilers
(TAO), Combat Stores Ships (TAFS), Fleet Ocean Tugs (TATF)] A second responsibility
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is operating special mission support ships such as oceanographic ships (TAGS), Cable
Repair Ships (TARC), and Missile Range Test Support Ships (TAGM).
Shipyards
U.S. shipyards (privately owned and operated). The Shipbuilders Council of America
represents 39 shipyards and 24 shipyard suppliers. The American Shipbuilders
Association represents six of the nation' large yards that primarily depend on
government contracts for combatants, e.g. carriers, submarines, frigates. Major U.S.
shipyards include: Newport News (VA), Bath Iron Works (ME), Avondale Industries
(LA), Ingalls Shipyards (MI), National Steel and Shipbuilding (CA), Electric Boat (CN),
Todd Pacific (WA) and Trinity Marine Group (MI).
Average monthly employment at shipyards in the Active Shipbuilding Base is 81,000+.
Total shipyard employment is approximately 100,000. As of April 1995, 311 ships of all
sizes and types were under construction in U.S. yards with a contract value of $24,224.9
million. The great majority of large ship contracts were for government account,
primarily for the U.S. Navy.
Foreign shipyards. Foreign shipyards play a significant role in the context of a world,
private sector maritime infrastructure. As a general rule, they offer lower prices for
building and repair as well as shorter delivery times. In 1981, operationally subsidized
U.S. flag carriers were allowed to build foreign without penalty. Periodically, disputes
arise over contracting U.S. government work to foreign shipyards.
At the beginning of l995, over l,000 vessels of l6 million metric tons were under
construction worldwide. Approximate market shares were: Japan 55 percent, South
Korea l6.5 percent, West Europe l4.5 percent. American labor rates were approximately
$30/hour which was comparable to those in Southern Europe. Other rates were
Northern Europe, $40/hour, Japan $60/hour. There is general agreement that U.S.
shipyards must combine increased productivity with their relatively low wage rate if
they are to be major players in global shipbuilding.
U.S. Naval Shipyards. These government owned shipyards engage in conversion,
overhaul and repair work. Naval shipyards have not engaged in new construction since
l968. In FY l983, employment at the nation's eight naval shipyards was approximately
89,000.
In l988 Congress created an independent commission to recommend military base
closures, including naval shipyards. As of May l995, none of the eight naval shipyards
were closed although several were recommended for closure---Charleston, SC,
Philadelphia, PA, and Long Beach, CA. When all of the planned closures are complete,
anticipated naval shipyard employment is estimated to be about 32,000.
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Maritime Labor
Historically, maritime labor, in particular the seagoing unions, wielded political clout
that far exceeded member numbers. However, as the U.S. flag merchant fleet
diminished and once powerful, senior, maritime-minded Democrat congressmen were
replaced for one reason or another, maritime union influence in Congress declined to its
lowest point in 60 years.
Technology has also taken its toll on seagoing and shipyard workers. Larger ships with
smaller crews has been the trend for over a quarter century while advanced
technology, in particular, modular construction, has significantly scaled back shipyard
employment. Add to this, the end of the Cold War with a concomitant to build fewer
naval vessels and the Navy's continuing goal to have an in-house merchant marine,
then the decline in maritime union membership is easily understood.
Shippers
America is a trading nation and as such, shippers-importers and exporters-constitute a
very powerful maritime interest group. There is little support within this group to "Buy
American," that is, use American flag ships, in a highly competitive world where service
and price are everything. This is not to suggest that U.S. flag operators cannot compete.
They have in the past. But to compete successfully, requires government support.
Shippers enter into the fray when a particular government policy in support of
American flag shipping adds to the landed price of their product or merchandise,
whether it be imports or exports. The largest and most powerful shipper groups are the
National Industrial Transportation League, the National Grain and Feed Council, and
the American Manufacturers Association.
The more competitive a world market, the more pressure will be exerted by shippers in
opposing maritime support policies that make them less competitive. Agricultural
producers and food processors for many years have vigorously resisted cargo
preference legislation that benefited U.S. flag operators.
U.S. Navy
In l996, the U.S. Navy is the largest consumer of private sector maritime products-from
nuclear powered aircraft carriers to shipping services provided by private sector ship
operators. Additionally, Navy-titled merchant ships are manned by thousands of
seagoing civil service employees.
At the peak of the Reagan administration buildup, the goal was a 600 ship navy. In l996,
the long term goal is a fleet of around 350 ships. Navy priorities are no longer to
contain a Soviet Union submarine fleet and simultaneously keep the sea lines of
communications open should a Warsaw Pact-NATO conflict erupt, but rather to project
force where American security interests are threatened and to deploy force should
regional conflicts involve U.S. forces. The Military Sealift Command is discussed in the
text of this report and in Appendix B.
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Federal Maritime Agencies
It can be plausibly argued that actions by just about any federal agency will have an
impact on one or more maritime players. Here, the discussion will be limited to the
Coast Guard (Department of Transportation), the Federal Maritime Commission
(Independent agency) and the Maritime Adminis-tration (Department of
Transportation) The Corps of Engineers will be discussed under seaports.
Coast Guard. In peacetime, the Coast Guard is an agency within the Department of
Transportation. In time of war it becomes, for all intent and purpose, a part of the
Navy. The Coast Guard's peacetime responsibilities include:
*Protect life and property in waters under U.S. jurisdiction, including security of U.S.
ports and waterways.
*Enforce U.S. maritime laws and international agreements to which the United States is
signatory, including environmental laws, e.g. discharge of oil or other pollutants into
U.S. waters.
Specific tasks include enforcement of safety standards for vessels, including vessel
construction and manning, with respect to both U.S. law and international agreements.
The Coast Guard operates the world's largest search and research organization,
including ice breaking and ice reporting in international waters. A more recent mission
is drug interdiction operations. The proposed FY l996 Coast Guard budget is $3.7 billion.
Federal Maritime Commission. The FMC is an independent federal agency. Its
responsibilities are primarily in the economic area, that is, monitoring rates in
international ocean shipping on routes serving U.S. ports. Prior to passage of the
Shipping Act of l984, the FMC was the primary enforcer and watchdog with respect to
the activities (rates and rationalization of tonnage) of international shipping conferences
serving American importers and exporters. In l996, there is a high probability that the
FMC will be abolished should deregulation of ocean shipping occur (the l984 Shipping
Act only partially deregulated the industry). If the FMC is abolished, questionable
actions of ship lines and ship conferences would most likely be reviewed by the
Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. During the first Reagan
administration, abolishing the FMC was actively considered.
Maritime Administration. The Maritime Administration is housed in the Department of
Transportation. Earlier its functions were administered by an Assistant Secretary of
Commerce for Maritime Affairs who also held the title of Maritime Administrator. As
often as not the position of Maritime Administrator has been filled by a retired Navy
admiral. The overall mission of the Maritime Administration is to promote the
development and operation of U.S. flag shipping, including Great Lakes shipping.
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Responsibilities include:
*Administering the remaining operating differential subsidy agreements held by U.S.
ship operators.
*Administering Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of l936,. as amended, which
guarantees financing for constructing vessels in U.S. shipyards, both foreign and U.S.
owned. The guarantor is the United States Government.
*Administer/manage the National Defense Reserve Fleet and the Ready Reserve Force.
Ready Reserve Force responsibilities are carried out in cooperation with the Military
Sealift Command. In l996 the RRF will be funded by the Department of Defense.
*Operates the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York and oversees
federal assistance programs for six state maritime academies located in Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, Texas, California, and Michigan.
*Supervises cargo preference programs.
In February of l995, the Secretary of Transportation outlined a reorganization plan
under which most maritime administration functions would be handled by a new
"Intermodal Agency" within DOT. The proposed FY l996 budget allocates $309 million
for MARAD operations.
Department of State. This organization weighs in on maritime policy discussions when
the issue is between the United States and one or more foreign governments. Examples
include negotiations to end worldwide shipbuilding subsidies; the question of whether
to restrict the export of Alaskan oil to U.S. flag vessels (the issue was settled in
November of l995 in favor of the restriction). The State Department opposed such
restrictions. The issue of cargo preference for American ships, particularly food exports,
and U.S. cabotage laws, e.g. the Jones Act, is also a contentious issue with the State
Department usually in opposition to U.S. maritime interests.
The Department was a major player in the recent discussion of whether or not to
include shipping services under the World Trade Organization's umbrella authority
(shipping services were ultimately exempted). The Department also has input with
respect to FMC rulings that involve directly or indirectly, foreign shipping interests. The
State Department's Maritime Transport Section is the focal point for the department's
position on various maritime issues.
International Maritime Organizations
These inter-governmental organizations are related to and work with the United
Nations. They administer and monitor, but not enforce, international agreements.
International Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO, formerly the Inter Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, monitors maritime conventions such as the
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International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, the Maritime Search and Rescue
Convention, and the Convention on Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. The IMO
adopted the International Safety Management Code which sets international standards
for the safe operation and management of vessels. One hundred forty seven (l47)
nations belong to the IMO.
International Labor Organization (ILO) This organization monitors l6 maritime labor
conventions, e.g., Convention Relating to Certificate of Competence for Able Seamen.
One hundred sixty nine countries are members of the ILO.
The Law of the Sea Convention l982 defines ocean space and how it is to be managed.
The United States has not ratified this convention.
The Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
established a Maritime Transport Committee as an intermediary with respect to
questions of charges for maritime freight between ship owners and shippers. It is also
charged to study ways to build up fleets of developing countries.
Shipping Conferences
A shipping conference is made up of two or more liner shipping firms offering services
over the same trade routes or trade areas. Membership in a conference is non restrictive
with respect to country of registry. By mutual agreement, a conference will set rates
and conditions of service. An open conference, by definition, is open to any vessel
operator, while membership in a closed conference is determined by conference
members.
The first shipping conference was established in 1879 over sea routes linking Great
Britain and India. Most governments exempt shipping conferences from anti-trust
action on the grounds that, on balance, conferences do more good than harm, rate
stability being a positive consideration.
The Federal Maritime Commission is the designated watchdog with respect to
conferences that offer services to the United States. The U.S. Shipping Act of 1984 was
generally deregulatory with respect to liner shipping services, although conferences
were still allowed to exist. In l994, a bitter controversy broke out between shippers and
the Trans Atlantic Agreement (TAA), a conference which set rates across the North
Atlantic. Shippers claimed TAA rates were excessive. The issue was taken up by the
FMC and its counterpart within the European Union. Fifteen companies make up the
TAA. They carry about 75 percent of the cargo moving on North Atlantic routes.
Seaports
The nation's seaports do not directly impact on the fortunes of American flag operators
and shipyards. As competitors for cargo, it is not in their interest to favor one flag over
another.
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A shipyard is considered a port asset, especially with regard to the jobs they provide.
Recent decisions to close some naval shipyards brought vigorous responses from the
seaports affected, e.g. Charleston, SC.
Aside from private sector initiatives to advance the fortunes of a particular port, ports
can be affected in two ways by government action. First, most ports depend upon the
Corps of Engineers for maintaining channel depths. With ever larger ships, a
competitive port must have the capability of handling large vessels. Second, federal port
user fees can influence a choice of ports by operators and shippers. Several years ago
tonnage fees on vessels using a port were proposed to partly cover Corps of Engineer
port costs. Methods for raising this revenue, however, were controversial. Small ports
favored a general fund where all fees were deposited and distributed on a need basis.
Larger ports favored a fee based on tonnage moved and/or containers handled.
Volume would allow large ports to charge less for the same amount of Corps work
while small ports with less volume would have to charge more.
In l994, a tonnage fee was proposed for bulk ships entering/clearing U.S. ports as a
means of funding operating subsidies for U.S. flag ship operators. While it passed the
House of Representatives, it failed in the Senate. The bill was bitterly opposed by bulk
shipper interests. In l996, port user fees are unlikely to be proposed as a means of
raising revenue for merchant marine support programs.
Vigorous competition among seaports will insure that private sector interests are
served. However, national defense requirements can be a significant addition to port
operating costs. For the most part, however, an efficiently managed port can handle
defense needs. Should a greater port capability be required, the additional cost is
properly a defense expenditure. Port security is another matter. In an age of terrorism,
responsible port authorities (private, local, and state) must have a comprehensive
security plan in place, either with or without federal participation. It is fair to say that a
secure port will be a competitive port.
In l995, some seaports came out in support of repealing U.S. cabotage laws that
restricted foreign flag cruise ships from carrying passengers between American ports.
Their motive was entirely economic and based on the assumption that removal of
restrictions would allow a port to capture a share or increase its share of a growing
cruise ship business. In their hurry to "cash in" some port authorities did not fully
appreciate the risks involved in alienating merchant marine supporters in Congress.
Classification Societies
These societies verify compliance of a vessel with respect to national and international
safety standards. The most important responsibilities are vessel classification, design
standards, and periodic surveys performed on vessels to insure compliance with
standards. A vessel's insurability depends upon such compliance.
The three major classification societies are the American Bureau of Shipping(ABS),
Lloyds Registry, and Det Norske Veritas. The umbrella group for all classification
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societies is the International Association of Classification Societies. In the United States,
the ABS and Coast Guard generally cooperate with respect to insuring that U.S. flag
ships are in compliance with international and national requirements.
Lobbies
With the exception of government agencies, most maritime players
are represented by privately supported lobbies located in Washington, DC. All are well
funded and active with respect to providing input (their position) on proposed maritime
legislation.
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APPENDIX B
The Military Sealift Command: A Nationalized
Merchant Marine
In time of war or national emergency, the armed services have always had a significant
ocean transport capability under their direct control. In World War II it was the Navy
Transport Service and the Army Transport Service. When airlift replaced sealift in the
movement of troops, much of the Army's rationale for maintaining an Army Transport
Service no longer existed. Not so, however, with the Navy. Its Navy Transport Service
became the Military Sea Transport Service and ultimately the present Military Sealift
Command (MSC), an agency that has refused to disappear although several studies
have urged that many MSC activities could as well be performed by privately owned
and operated merchant ships. (l)
In l987, the long sought consolidation of DOD's transportation agencies (MSC, the
Military Airlift Command (MAC), and the Military Traffic Management Command
(MTMC) seemingly took place. What occurred, however, was not the creation of a
single agency but rather four agencies replacing the original three. In this respect a U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) was created to coordinate and oversee the
three service commands. The MSC and MTMC retained their original names. The
Military Airlift Command became the Air Mobility Command. Flag rank officers
continue to head the subordinate commands. In l996 an Air Force four star general
heads TRANSCOM.
The present arrangement is probably not what the 1955 recommendation of the
Transportation Task Force of the Hoover Commission had in mind when it
recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a Director of Transportation
having no responsibility except those pertaining to traffic and transportation.
Fifteen years after Hoover Commission recommendations, the MSC survived the
recommendation of a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel which recommended that MSC, MAC
and MTMC be incorporated into a Logistics Command. In part the panel's
recommendation stated:
The responsibility for providing supply distribution, maintenance and transportation
services to the combatant forces in Unified and Specified Commands under the Strategic
and Tactical Commands should be assigned to the unified Logistics Command. The
Logistics Command should be assigned the traffic management and terminal
management functions now allocated to the Military Traffic Management Command
and Terminal Service (MTMTS), the Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), and the
Theater Traffic Management agencies. The Military Airlift Command and Military Sea
Transportation Command both should be assigned to the Logistics Command. The
Logistics Command should be directed to develop, under policy guidance of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications), an ADP logistics system to
encompass supply distribution elements that can be shared among the Services, and all
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development and procurement activity toward separate ADP logistics systems not
essential to support of near-term operations should be suspended. (2)
In l995, the MSC employed 9,700 people worldwide--about two thirds aboard ship. It
operated l43 ships in three forces: Strategic Sealift (90), Fleet Auxiliary (40), and Special
Mission Support (l3). The agency could also call upon the government-owned, Marad
maintained, inactive Ready Reserve Force of 89 ships. The annual MSC budget is
approximately $2.3 billion.
In addition to its DOD titled tonnage, MSC, depending upon need, charters privately
owned vessels. (3) Of the approximately 6400 people on board MSC ships, a majority
are civil service employees or uniformed Navy personnel. Union crews, however, are
employed on a number of MSC-controlled ships, generally those operated for the
government by private contractors.
The Military Sealift Command mission as stated in 1995:
MSC's mission will continue to expand despite a down-sizing American military force.
Ships will be added to the Strategic Sealift Force as U.S. bases abroad continue to close.
The reduction of forces compounds the challenge to provide a rapid, strong military
response. Additional surge and pre-positioned sealift will help to compensate for a
vastly reduced U.S. presence overseas. (4)
In 1996, it can fairly be said that the Navy's view of who should be the primary supplier
of merchant type shipping in time of war and peace has prevailed.

(l) For a detailed discussion of attempts to streamline DOD's military transportation
functions see: The Defense Transportation System: Competitor or Complement to the
Private Sector by Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise
Institute, (l976), and The U.S. Merchant Marine: In Search of An Enduring Maritime
Policy by the same author (U.S. Naval Institute Press, l983).
(2) Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Report to the President and Secretary of Defense on the
Department of Defense (Washington, D.C U..S. Government Printing Office, l970), p.
l07.
(3) In l995, MSC began awarding a series of long term charters to private sector tanker
operators. The chartered vessels will replace nine older chartered vessels that were
found to be unsafe and dangerous. A l994 Senate Subcommittee severely criticized MSC
management of these vessels. The new charters will not be classified as "public vessels"
as was the case with the nine ships they are replacing.
(4) Defense Transportation Journal (February l995), p. 25.
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APPENDIX C
Global Alliances Between U.S. and Foreign
Airlines, 31 December 1994
Strategic Alliances. A strategic alliance can be characterized as one where two (or more)
carriers integrate their operations on a global basis to the extent allowed by national
laws.
A strategic alliance between two carriers, at a minimum, would include joint marketing
and sales, shared facilities, code-sharing (l), and frequent flyer links.(2) Further
integration of operations would occur with blocked space agreements, revenue pooling,
route planning, including shared marketing data, and standardized agreements, e.g.
maintenance and services.
A strategic alliance can include equity arrangements, that is, one carrier owning stock of
its partner or partner airlines owning shares of stock in each other.
A complete alliance would be a true merger between carriers. This is not, however,
permitted under current U.S. law or the laws of any developed nation Examples of
strategic alliances include:
Northwest Airlines-KLM Royal Dutch Airline. This alliance included a 25% equity
investment in Northwest by KLM. Their code-sharing network links 88 U.S. cities with
30 European and Middle East cities. Since the alliance, Northwest-KLM market share on
trans-Atlantic routes has increased from 7 percent to 11.5 percent in l994, adding 350,000
passengers a year. KLM's profit increased four-fold to $30 million in its fiscal year
ending March 3l, l995.
British Airways-U.S. Air-Qantas.(3) British Airways purchased a 24.6 percent stake in
U.S. Air and a 25 percent stake in Qantas.. The BA-U.S. code sharing network links 52
U.S. cities with BA destinations worldwide. The number of code share passengers
booked increased from 8,439 in l993 to 67,593 in l994.
United Airlines-Lufthansa. Their code-sharing network links 25 U.S. cities with 30
European and Middle East cities. United Airlines expects the UA-LH agreement reached
in l994 to increase traffic by 2l9,000 between l994 and l995. United Airlines also has
regional alliances with British Midland and Ansett Australia. Lufthansa also is party to
several regional alliances.
Delta-Swiss Air-Singapore Airlines. This alliance includes equity swaps with some
partners. Delta also has code-share arrangements with Aeroflot, Aeromexico, Austrian
Airlines, Sabena, and Japan Airlines. (4)
Regional Alliances. The difference between a strategic alliance and a regional alliance is
the scope of the operation. Strategic alliances serve global markets while a regional
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alliance is characterized by service on a limited number of routes from one nation to
another.
Point Specific Alliances. These alliances involve service between city pairs. Examples
include: Continental Airlines-Scandinavian Airlines, Delta-Japan Airlines, United
Airlines-Ansett New Zealand, and U.S. Air-Alitalia.
There were 50 active alliances of all types between U.S. and foreign carriers as of
December 3l, l994. Of these, three were considered strategic (Delta-Swiss Air-Singapore
Airlines not included), nine regional alliances and 38 point-specific. (5)
As of February l995, there were 72 bilateral agreements between the United States and
foreign countries.
Global airline alliances will not only continue to exist but expand. The results thus far
indicate that alliances generally increase revenues and traffic for alliance partners,
particularly those which include equity interests. There is a 73 percent survival rate
among alliances that include ownership as opposed to a 26 percent survival rate of
alliances where an airline does not have a stake in the alliance partner. (6)
Most alliances entered into in l995 are not cited above. This, however, does not alter the
point being made---global alliances will play the dominant role in the movement of
freight and passengers by air in the 21st century. That many alliances will be between
multimodal firms with airline components is a certainty.

(1) Code-sharing is an arrangement wherein one carrier uses its designator code (e.g.
UA-United Airlines) to market flights of its partner carrier as if the foreign carrier's
flights were its own.
(2) Standard interline agreements and through ticket handling, scheduling, facility
sharing, and joint promotions do not require U.S. government approval. Code-sharing,
revenue pooling, network planning, setting of fares, and foreign ownership in the
carrier of another nation, does require approval.

(3) British Airways other equity investments include a stake in TAT, and Deutsche BA.
(4) Strategic, regional and point-specific code-sharing arrangements are described and
commented upon in detail in: U.S. General Accounting Office, International Aviation:
Airline Alliances Produce Benefits, but Effect on Competition is Uncertain (Washington,
D.C.: U..S. General Accounting Office, l995) GAO/RCED-95-99.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Investor's Business Daily (August 2l, l995) p. A4.
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APPENDIX D
Seagoing Wages
On average, crew expenses account for about 11 percent of the cost of door to door
container delivery. Comparative crew costs in thousands of U.S. dollars per month for a
containership operating under the U.S. flag, European flags, and Asian flags are
approximately: (l)
European
$80,000

Asian
$95,000

United States
$340,000

Monthly base wages, overtime and benefits for selected shipboard jobs on a
containership under different flags: (U.S.$)

Position
U.S. Flag(a)
Master
$32,653
2d Officer
18,727
Radio Officer
5,l42
1st Engineer
23,229
2d Engineer
18,848
Chief Steward
9,053
Able Seaman
6,022

European(a)
$9,697
7,036
5,475
8,425
7,845
7,6l9
4,510

Asian(a)
$4,331
1,979
2,874
2,796
1,979
2,118
1,610

ITF(b)
$2,884
1,491
1,491
1,862
1,49l
1,491
856

(a) Source: Maritime Administration "Competitive Manning of U.S.-Flag Vessels."
(b) Source: International Transport Workers Federation. Note: ITF wage scales apply to
approximately 20 percent of flag of convenience vessels. Non-ITF crews are paid
significantly less.
Another wage comparison was made by former Maritime Administrator, Warren G.
Leback (2)
Position
Master
2d Officer
Radio Officer
1st Engineer
2d Engineer
Chief Steward
Able Seaman

Hourly ITF Rate ($)
$12.00
6.21
6.2l
7.76
6.21
6.21
3.57
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Above/Below U.S.
Minimum Wage
$6.75
0.96
0.96
2.51
0.96
0.96
(1.27)

Comment
It was suggested in the text that if it is granted that the cost differential of maintaining a
sufficient number of active, militarily useful, merchant ships (and their crews) is a
national security expenditure, then the better comparison is between U.S. and foreign
military personnel
There is little doubt that U.S. crews are better trained and held to higher standards than
those of any other country. Again, as suggested in the text, the most enlightened
competitive strategy is to have crew sizes on U.S. vessels basically set by what is
required for the safe navigation of the vessel. In most cases, while this would mean a
reduction in crew size, it would also mean a significant increase in crew productivity.

(1) "Work on the Waves," Journal of Commerce (August 8, l995) Original sources cited in
the article were the Maritime Administration and the International Transport Workers
Federation.
(2) Leback, Warren G. "Letters to the Editor," Journal of Commerce, August l4, l995
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APPENDIX E
The Last Clear Chance For An Enduring
Maritime Policy
A principle in tort law that is applied by some courts is the "Last clear chance doctrine."
Simply put, the negligence of the party having the last clear chance (last opportunity) to
avoid an accident is solely responsible for the accident, notwithstanding the negligence
of the other party.
This principle was once firmly established in admiralty courts when responsibility for a
collision at sea was being determined. Gradually, however, the courts moved away
from the position that the ship having the last clear chance to avoid a collision was solely
responsible if a collision occurred. The more recent doctrine is that when the negligence
of both parties continues right up to the time of the collision, then both parties are
negligent (l) In an American case, the court said "Rules of navigation are ordained to
preserve life and property and not to promote and authorize collisions. Even flagrant
fault committed by one of two vessels approaching each other from opposite directions
will not excuse the other from adopting every proper precaution to prevent a collision." (2)
The compromise between a strict adherence to the last clear chance doctrine and the
shared negligence rule is embodied in Article 27 of the International (and Inland) Rules
of the Road. Article 27 states: In obeying and construing these rules due regard shall be
had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances which
may render a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate
danger. (3) Generally, under this rule, a vessel may depart from the rules in some
situations without the departure being held to be a fault and, indeed, may be found at
fault for not departing from the general provisions of the rules..
The analogy of Congress as a "vessel" having a last clear chance to avoid an impending
collision, that is, to prevent the United States from sliding into the role of a minor
commercial maritime power, seems reasonable. Congress alone has the power to act
and it is of little consequence as to which political party, politician(s), federal agency,
private sector entity, or presidential administration, was to blame in setting our
maritime industries on a collision course, one that unless changed, will lead to the
destruction of the United States as a maritime nation. There is more than enough
negligence to go around.
With their assent to power, the Republican Congress has charted a course which
re-defines the role of government in the affairs of the nation. The heart of their agenda
is to reduce the size and authority of the Federal Government and bring federal
revenues and expenditures into balance. These goals have the support of the majority of
Americans. However, as Republican congressional leaders well know, and the general
prudential rule tells us, there are times when a set course, no matter how carefully
plotted, must be changed in order to avoid disaster. Essentially, this means that a well
defined, cost effective, maritime support program is deserving of federal funding even
as the process of downsizing the federal bureaucracy and the federal budget continues.
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Should merchant marine support legislation be put off until the 105th Congress in
January l997, the collective "memory loss" of the various committees, knowledgeable
individuals, including committees staff, and the countless pages of testimony at
hearings, would be a heavy blow to Congressional maritime supporters.
(l) An excellent discussion of the last clear opportunity rule is found in Maritime Law by
Christopher Hill (Pitman: 1981).
(2) The America, 92 U.S. 432,438, 23L Ed. 724. Cited in Cases on Admiralty by George C.
Sprague and Nicholas J. Healy, 3d ed. p. 709.
(3) U.S.C.A. 112 and 212.
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EPILOGUE
As of 31 January l996, the Congress had not passed the enabling legislation necessary to
ratify the OECD accord to end shipping subsidies. The European Union, South Korea
and Norway had already signed the agreement. Japan had not.
Differences of opinion surfaced as to the effect the OECD agreement would have on
Jones Act provisions requiring the U.S. domestic tonnage be built in American yards.
The U.S. position is that the OECD agreement will not materially affect U.S. shipyards.
The European Union argues that American shipyards building under the Jones Act
could face financial counter-measures when bidding on foreign contracts.
At the end of January l996, the Senate version of the Maritime Security Act (S 1139) had
not been acted upon. The House had already passed its version of the bill (HR l350).
In December l995, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the nation's oldest regulatory
body, ceased to exist. Remaining responsibilities will be transferred to other
government agencies.
In a 15 April l996 letter to colleagues in the House of Representatives, the
entire membership of the House Merchant Marine Oversight Panel reaffirmed its
support for the so-called Jones Act (Section 27, Merchant Marine Marine Act l920). The
act restricts the movement of freight between
American ports to U.S. crewed, U.S. built tonnage.
As of 1 June l996, the Congress had not acted on HR l350, the Maritime
Security Act of l995. The act would provide $l billion in subsidies over a l0 year period
for approximately 50 militarily useful merchant ships.
As of l June l996, the Congress had not acted to "sunset" the Federal Maritime
Commission.
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